INTRODUCTION
ational governments worldwide are joining in the pursuit of two concurrent international objectives: enhancing economic welfare by liberalizing world trade and mitigating climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 1 The two distinct multilateral efforts-administered by the WTO 2 and the Kyoto Protocol 3 -operate simultaneously and autonomously to achieve their respective goals. At the intersection of the two efforts, however, lies the potential for conflict. 4 International trade is the exchange of capital, goods, and services across international borders or territories. 5 Throughout history, there have been numerous models for international trade; however, all models share the basic characteristic that the pattern of a nation's production can differ from the pattern of its consumption. 6 This allows any country to experience greater access to resources not endemic to its particular area, as well as a pecuniary benefit from entering the world market. 7 When a country voluntarily complies with a domestic or international emissions abatement program, a global benefit is reached at a cost to the participating country. 8 However, an agreement that does not include the participation of all global actors always leaves open the possibility for "carbon leakage." 9 For example, one /np/exr/facts/enviro.htm (last visited July 24, 2013) (affirming that "[designing a response] to climate change has become one of the world's foremost policy challenges"). country or region may implement an incentive structure that reduces internal carbon emissions only to have the emissions relocate to a country without such regulations. 10 This fear is not lost on the WTO member nations that are both attempting to procure the benefits of international trade and voluntarily abating emissions. There is a widespread belief that pervasive international resentment over such free riding could lead to the implementation of policies that penalize a country for competitive advantages resulting from its non-adherence to collective actions aimed at mitigating anthropogenic impacts on the environment.
11
The United States' failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol inarguably contributed to the "clash over climate change commitments" concerning the agreement on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 12 This free rider problem is endemic to political processes and has substantial implications for voluntary commitments to public good. 13 The differing measures and commitments, or lack thereof, among the world's nations for mitigating climate change and reducing emissions present significant ground for international conflict. While many nations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and adopted regimes to combat global climate change in accordance with their legally binding commitments, others have not, creating for themselves an inherent competitive advantage.
14 In response, WTO member nations seeking to "rebalance the economic burden of shifting to a low-carbon 10 Id. 11 A "free rider" refers to someone who benefits from resources, goods, benefits, or services without paying for the cost of the benefit. James A. Sheppard, Productivity Loss in Performance Groups: A Motivation Analysis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 67, 69 (1993) . See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2 ("The possibility of a clash over climate change commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and WTO rules arises because of the U.S. decision to abandon Kyoto. Strong resentment over this action, particularly in Europe, could lead the EU, and perhaps others, to undertake actions to penalize American and other non-Annex 1 firms for alleged competitive advantages resulting from their non-adherence to Kyoto, although the probability of such action is low at the present time."); see also John Hontelez, Time to Tax the Carbon Dodgers, BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2007, 10:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk /2/hi/6524331.stm ("These countries [which haven't ratified the Kyoto Protocol and don't impose a 'carbon charge' on their exports] unfairly favour their own goods and discriminate against nations that do apply such a charge, as the European Union is doing with its Emissions Trading Scheme, and some of its members with carbon taxes."). 12 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2. 13 14 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2.
society" have looked to international trade law to even the playing field.
15
Anthropogenic climate change is a widely recognized global problem. 16 According to the International Energy Agency, trends indicate that "delaying action is a false economy" 17 and cost of taking measures to combat climate change now is much less expensive than waiting until 2020 or 2030. 18 Both from an economic and a sociological perspective, experts agree that the time for action on this issue is now. The impetuses behind this Article are to consider and embrace the validity of a carbon tax regime vis-à-vis international trade law, and to solve the collective action problem that underlies action in response to global climate change.
This Article first will discuss why carbon taxation, as part of a tax regime composed of both carbon taxes and border adjustments, is a viable solution for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and mitigating climate change. It will then explore the necessity for border adjustments as a supplement to carbon taxation as a means to conserve an exhaustible natural resource. Border adjustments additionally reduce the loss of competitiveness suffered by domestic industries and producers in relation to their international competitors not subject to similar tax obligations. Moreover, this Article discusses the implications of such proposed measures on the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, thoroughly analyzing the relevant provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as the considerable uncertainty that surrounds the topic due to the lack of jurisprudence on border adjustments. Finally, in a world ever-nearing the precarious "point of no return" amid discussion of topics where "certainty is impossible," this Article addresses the viability of a solution that 15 See, e.g., Hontelez, supra note 11. 16 
A. The Kyoto Protocol
In December 1997, 160 developed and developing countries adopted the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement that set binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 20 Parties originally committed to reduce emissions to an average of five percent below 1990 levels. 21 Although the first commitment period ended in 2012, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change reconvened in December 2012 to adopt the "Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol," which creates a new commitment period for the current 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 22 During the second commitment period, from 2013 to 2020, Parties have committed to reduce emissions by at least eighteen percent below 1990 levels.
23
The Kyoto Protocol offers Parties considerable flexibility in meeting their prescribed emissions commitments. 24 Countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to limit or reduce emissions must meet their targets primarily through national measures. 25 As an additional means of meeting these targets, the Kyoto Protocol 
C. Relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the World Trade Organization
The international community shares joint interests in enhancing economic wellbeing through promoting world trade and mitigating global climate change via the reduction of greenhouse gases. To further those joint interests, the international community has supported two distinct multilateral efforts: the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO. However, the implementation of various proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol may impede international trade, thereby potentially violating the WTO's rules governing world trade.
37
Article II of the Kyoto Protocol urges Parties to implement their policies and measures "in such a way as to minimize adverse effects . . . on international trade." 38 The relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO becomes "increasingly pertinent as proposals percolate to the surface" that implement border adjustments in conjunction with other market mechanisms designed to mitigate climate change. 39 Part II addresses and resolves the potential regulatory conflicts between a carbon tax regime under the Kyoto Protocol and the rules of international trade provided by the WTO under GATT. 34 The "national treatment" principle is "nondiscrimination between imported products and like domestic products." Carlarne, supra note 33, at 60. 35 Id. 36 Herman, supra note 32, at 196. 37 The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars illustrates an example of how WTO/GATT trade provisos may create a conflict between trade rules and environmental measures: a semiconductor produced with ozone-depleting substances would be banned in accordance with the Montreal Protocol. However, the "like" product provision of GATT Article III likely would invalidate the trade discrimination based on the use of ozonedepleting substances. WILLIAM KRIST, WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, THE WTO AND MEAS: TIME FOR A GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY (2002), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-wto-and-meas-time-for-good-neighbor -policy. 38 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 2. 39 Herman, supra note 32, at 196.
II MEETING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL'S OBJECTIVE OF REMEDYING "MARKET IMPERFECTIONS" THROUGH A CARBON TAX REGIME

A. Carbon Taxation
"Economists of nearly all methodological and ideological stripes concur that the best way . . . to stave off the worst impacts of climate change is through some form of taxation on the carbon content of fossil fuels." 40 Generally, market prices for carbon-based fuels and products or services that require the use of such fuels do not reflect the full social and environmental costs of their production and consumption. 41 In economics, the term "externality" represents the additional cost or benefit that results from an activity or transaction and that affects an otherwise uninvolved party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit. 42 Because externalities are oftentimes pushed from the transaction onto the public at large, they form an inefficient market. 43 Carbon taxes curb emissions by incorporating the negative externalities of fossil fuels and increasing the price of fuels with higher carbon contents, thereby internalizing the costs of the former externality and reducing demand for carbon-based fuels. 44 Putting a price on carbon provides the appropriate market incentives to reduce carbon emissions. 45 A tax structure based on carbon content would increase the cost of producing energy from fossil fuels, which would encourage market participants to reduce 40 their consumption of such energy and create the appropriate incentives for more efficient energy use. 46 The tax would create further incentives to reduce the use of carbon-intensive energy by flowing through the cost to consumer products; as a result, consumers would economize in consumption and manufacturers would become more efficient in order to increase profits. 47 Carbon taxes provide price stabilization while allowing for adjustability, market certainty, and predictability. 48 Because most carbon taxes are included in the overall price of energy, the portion of energy cost per unit that stems from fluctuations in market rates for fossil fuels would shrink as a percentage of the whole. 49 That shrinkage makes the price of a given form of energy less volatile in calculating production costs, while increasing investor and consumer confidence. 50 Moreover, a carbon tax regime would have the flexibility to strain or relax the carbon levy subject to current market conditions.
51 By these mechanisms, carbon taxes would enable countries to regularly monitor and assess energy consumption and make appropriate adjustments to maintain predictability and certainty within the market.
The structure of a carbon tax regime makes it the superior choice among alternatives allowed under the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon taxes function as an excise tax based on the carbon content of fuel and would be imposed on market participants for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere. 52 Many economists view a revenue-neutral carbon tax regime as a superior policy alternative for reducing greenhouse gas emissions because "a carbon tax equal to the damage per ton of CO 2 will lead to exactly the right balance between 46 Id. at 6. 47 Id. at 5-6. 48 the cost of reducing emissions and the resulting benefits of less global warming." 53 Research also shows that the efficacy of such a carbonpricing mechanism produces net gains five times higher than even the best designed quantity-control regime, such as a cap-and-trade system. 54 Moreover, revenue collected from carbon taxes would remain within the sovereign's control, so nations could maintain independence and retain revenues within the individual sovereign state.
55 Such a policy would remove a country's incentives for cheating or insincere participation in carbon-reduction programs. 56 Countries could use their preexisting tax collection mechanisms and institutions, with extensive experience in enforcing compliance, to make it difficult for market participants to manipulate the system or avoid carbon taxes. 57 Furthermore, carbon taxation lends itself to the concept of a double-dividend, where the tax is paired with a reduction of other taxes in a way that improves the overall efficiency of the implementing nation's economy. 58 The first dividend is the actual reduction of the adverse environmental externality. 59 The second dividend is the improvement in economic efficiency from the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes, such as income taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions. 60 In this respect, carbon taxes "can produce a far more equitable result than cap-andtrade" systems through either the double dividend concept or "progressive tax-shifting to reduce regressive payroll or sales taxes." 61 Several countries have successfully adopted carbon taxes as a central component of their efforts to reduce emissions. 63 Carbonpricing schemes are expected to have jurisdiction in at least thirtythree countries and eighteen sub-national jurisdictions by the end of 2013.
64 Denmark used revenue generated from its carbon taxes to concurrently finance energy efficiency investments that reduced its emissions by four percent between 1992 and 2000. 65 In 1990, Finland implemented a carbon tax and reduced its emissions seven percent by 1998. 66 Similarly, Sweden reduced its carbon emissions by roughly twenty percent between 1991 and 2000. 67 The success of carbon tax programs abroad only increases the practicability of implementing such regimes elsewhere as the most efficient means of complying with their emission commitments.
While carbon taxes offer an effective means of complying with the Kyoto Protocol, they also have significant implications for international trade. 68 In the absence of an internationally uniform tax, the imposition of a carbon tax in any particular country or region will lead to less economically competitive domestic industries when compared to foreign competitors not subject to taxation. 69 For instance, domestic producers would bear the burden of increased energy taxes that would increase their production costs, while foreign producers would incur no additional costs. The consequences of such 62 GREEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 10-11. 63 asymmetry would be especially severe for energy-intensive sectors. 70 In those sectors, energy prices comprise a significant share of total production costs, making them particularly vulnerable to the competitive disadvantage of a carbon tax and thus likely to resist the implementation of such taxes. 71 Accordingly, in the 1990s, carbon tax proposals in the United States, the European Union, and Australia failed largely because of opposition from the energy-intensive sectors and other business interests that feared losing their international competitiveness. Because of such opposition, no national government would be able to implement a carbon tax without offering concurrent measures to lessen the burden on the energy-intensive sectors.
72
The presence of international trade also threatens the environmental objectives of the tax. In the absence of countervailing measures, reductions in domestic carbon emissions may simply be offset by carbon leakage. 73 Thus, national governments must design carbon tax policies that address both the economic and the environmental consequences of international trade. Because such measures may disrupt trade flows, these offsetting policies constitute the central point of tension between the goals of the Kyoto Protocol and the rules of the WTO.
To counterbalance the economic burden of a carbon tax, national governments have three primary options. Governments may resolve to neutralize the burden by exempting the energy-intensive sectors; however, such actions diminish the efficacy of the tax by limiting the incentive among the market participants that pollute the most. 70 "Anyone writing a carbon tax would have to make many design decisions, including how and whether to protect trade-exposed, energy-intensive industries from being placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign competitors." See Chemnick, supra note 68. 71 Alternatively, governments may use the tax revenue acquired to lower other taxes or to provide refunds to corporations in order to ease the burden on adversely affected sectors. 75 While revenue recycling is preferable to exemptions because it maintains the incentive to reduce emissions, it may be inefficient and firms may still incur a loss of competitiveness under such a plan. Therefore, the most effective way to maintain international competitiveness without compromising the efficacy of the tax is to adjust the taxes of energy-intensive goods at the border. 76 A border adjustment consists of imposing carbon taxes on imports at the domestic rate in order to maintain competitiveness domestically while relieving exports of taxation, allowing them to compete untaxed in international markets.
77 "By removing the asymmetry between foreign and domestic producers, [border adjustments] offer a solution to the loss of competitiveness arising from carbon taxes."
78 However, because these taxes serve as possible barriers to trade, they also present a potential conflict with WTO rules.
79
B. Border Adjustments
Border adjustments have the potential to serve as a remedy for conflicting tax regimes between trading nations. In recognition of the potential for border adjustments to harmonize differing tax regimes as well as their anticipated conflicts with WTO law, the international economic community formed the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments ("Working Party") in 1968. 80 The Working Party was charged with examining the GATT provisions relevant to border adjustments, the practices of contracting parties to border adjustments, and the possible effects of such adjustments on international trade, before reporting its findings and recommendations 75 to the WTO General Council. 81 In its examination, the Working Party adopted the definition of "border adjustment" created by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold to consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country in respect of similar domestic products).
82
While the Working Party found border adjustments applied to imports that are "like" the domestic, locally taxed products permissible, 83 it offered little guidance as to whether imported products produced from carbon-emitting Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) 84 were eligible for border adjustments.
85
Border adjustments could serve as "a justifiable threat to irresponsible governments . . . , which refuse to implement Kyoto." 86 Ideally, they would apply to both imports and exports entering into international trade, enabling nations to offset the economic burdens associated with carbon taxes when trading countries vary in their tax regimes. 87 Nations could tax imports from non-carbon-taxing countries based on their carbon content. 88 This would enable 81 Id. ¶ 1. 82 Id. ¶ 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 83 Id. 84 A process and production method is the way in which a product is made. Many products go through a number of stages, and therefore a number of PPMs, before they are ready for market. For example, making paper requires trees to be grown and harvested, the wood to be processed, the pulp often to be bleached, and so on. The various processes will have different sorts of environmental impacts-on biodiversity, on forest-based streams and wildlife, on human health from chemical pollution of waterways, or in terms of air pollution and energy use. Other paper may be made from post-consumer waste, a different process involving a different set of environmental impacts. INT'L INST. FOR countries to "rectify domestic price differentials by taxing imported products at the same level as those produced domestically." 89 For exports, nations could offer rebates for carbon taxes paid by taxed producers for goods exported to other countries with carbon taxes. 90 Countries would be able to refund the carbon taxes paid by their domestic producers for exported goods in order to prevent the double taxation of domestic producers by both the domestic state as well as the importing state.
91
Although carbon taxes coupled with border adjustments present a viable solution for reducing emissions, the unilateral adoption of such a regime "may well raise complex questions with respect to the WTO consistency and the conditions under which border taxes can be adjusted to accommodate a loss of international competitiveness." 92 These questions arise because such a tax regime may be considered a barrier to trade, and therefore present a potential conflict with the rules of the WTO.
III THE GATT-LEGALITY OF BORDER ADJUSTMENTS
A. The Uncertainty and Lack of WTO Jurisprudence Surrounding Border Adjustments
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the interpretation of WTO trade rules as they apply to border adjustments. While border adjustments on direct taxes 94 are categorically impermissible under GATT, they may be permitted in some circumstances for certain types 89 Id. at 42. 90 92 See DEAL, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting Assunção & XiangZhang supra note 27, at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). 93 All WTO members must undergo periodic scrutiny of their trade policies and practices to ensure they do not impose an unfair barrier to trade. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 30.
94 "Direct taxes are primarily taxes on natural persons (e.g., individuals), and they are typically based on the taxpayer's ability to pay as measured by income, consumption, or net wealth." Taxation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com /EBchecked/topic/584578/taxation (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). of indirect taxes. 95 At the time of the drafting of GATT in the mid1940s, little consideration was paid to the interaction of GATT with market-based measures aimed at mitigating climate change and environmental damage. 96 In fact, the rules on border adjustments were "developed primarily with the goals of competitiveness and absence of protectionism in mind." 97 Further, "[t]hey were not developed with environmental taxes in mind." 98 Consequently, environmentally driven market-based measures like carbon tax border adjustments do not easily fit into the rules and exceptions established by international trade law, and a tremendous lack of clarity surrounds the interpretation of GATT rules as applied to indirect taxes like border adjustments.
99
To contribute to the existing muddiness and doubt surrounding GATT-legality of border adjustments on carbon taxes, WTO law does not recognize the doctrine of stare decisis.
100 Accordingly, the WTO's dispute settlement bodies (DSBs) are not bound by precedent, further complicating this analysis. 101 In the absence of the stare decisis doctrine, it is difficult-if not impossible-to predict with any certainty how the WTO may rule on any given issue. 95 Despite its inability to bind its DSBs to precedent, some solace may be found in the fact that
[i]f the reasoning developed in the previous report in support of the interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the perspective of the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent case, it is very likely that the panel or the Appellate Body will repeat and follow it.
102
While this does not openly insinuate the principle of precedent, the qualification of "very likely" does suggest that previous reports are good indicators of the likely outcomes of similar disputes. This is also in line with a key objective of the dispute settlement system which is to enhance the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. . . . In the words of the Appellate Body, these GATT and WTO panel reports-and equally adopted Appellate Body reports-"create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute."
103
Due to the enormity of uncertainty surrounding GATT-legality of border adjustments, it is imperative to thoroughly explore the relevant provisions of the WTO and GATT to predict how the WTO may adjudicate the matter.
B. The Potential Application of GATT Provisions to Border Adjustments
Generally, WTO and GATT rules aim to ensure non-discriminatory measures and prevent disguised protectionism efforts by nations.
104
When a nation's proposed measures violate the relevant provisions set forth by WTO and GATT, the nation may seek to argue for the measure's legality under GATT Article XX, which provides for general exceptions. 105 Article XX of GATT allows for preferential measures that may violate other GATT provisions under very narrow exceptions, and only when the treatment is not arbitrary or discriminatory.
106 Therefore, determining the legality of border adjustments for carbon taxes requires a two-tier analysis. First, whether the border adjustments can satisfy the relevant controlling GATT provisions, namely Articles I and III. Second, if they cannot, 102 Id. 103 Id. 104 Herman, supra note 32, at 200. 105 GATT, supra note 33, at art. III(2). 106 Id. at art. XX. then whether carbon tax border adjustments may qualify for an Article XX exception.
Border Adjustments Under GATT Articles I and III
Because border adjustments may impede international trade in their efforts to neutralize the loss of competitiveness suffered by domestic industries of carbon taxing nations, GATT Articles I and III likely pose the greatest obstacles to the legality of such equalizing provisions.
107
GATT Article III contains the "national treatment" clause, which states in relevant part: "[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products." 108 The national treatment requirement, therefore, mandates that nations treat imported products no less favorably than "like" domestic products.
Herein lies an important WTO distinction regarding the legality of border adjustments on carbon taxes: product taxes versus process taxes. Product taxes, or taxes on a final product, are generally accepted as legal under GATT. 109 For example, a country may permissibly impose a domestic tax or border adjustment on imported gasoline because the gasoline constitutes a final product. Nations may impose restrictions on such imports as long as such restrictions are comparable to those imposed on domestic goods with respect to their physical characteristics and performance. 110 In contrast, process taxes, or taxes on production inputs including land, labor, and raw materials, are highly controversial and their legality is less certain.
111
Nations likely would violate the national treatment clause if they sought to impose restrictions on how a product was made if those production methods did not affect the product's performance or characteristics. 112 107 DEAL, supra note 4, at 5. 108 GATT, supra note 33, at art. III(2). 109 DAVID W. PEARCE, BLUEPRINT 4: CAPTURING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 95 (1995).
110 DEAL, supra note 4, at 5. 111 Id. 112 Id.
WTO law further distinguishes taxing inputs that remain physical components of the final product and inputs that are not incorporated into the final product from taxing products based on their PPM. 113 Generally, GATT rules permit border adjustments on inputs that remain physical components of the final product. However, no WTO dispute panel has yet ruled on the legality of taxing inputs that are not incorporated into the final product. As a result, nations bidding to implement border adjustments for carbon taxes (which are based on the energy consumed in the production of a product) must resort to searching WTO case law and investigating legislative history for further guidance. Even then, it cannot be said with certainty how the WTO would rule on the matter.
In the Superfund case, 114 the WTO dispute panel upheld a U.S. tax on imported chemicals based on the amount of feedstock chemicals created during production, a process-based border adjustment. 115 It upheld the border adjustment on the basis that it "corresponded to an internal United States tax on the same chemicals from which the imported substances were derived."
116 While this holding would seemingly support GATT-legality of border adjustments for carbon taxes, its transferability and persuasiveness is complicated by what the dispute panel failed to consider. 117 The panel failed to consider whether the domestically taxed U.S. feedstock and imported chemicals were "like" products, nor did it consider whether the foreign feedstock chemicals were physically incorporated in the imported chemicals. 118 Moreover, it did not determine whether such an inquiry was even relevant. 119 Furthermore, the WTO dispute panels of Tuna/Dolphin I and Tuna/Dolphin II held that an import ban on tuna could not be based on the manner in which the tuna were caught if the final product was not affected. 120 The cases stood for the proposition that countries cannot discriminate against products based on the way they are produced unless such production processes affect the physical characteristics of the final product. 121 Under the Tuna/Dolphin regime, the physical characteristics of a product were the only relevant considerations for determining whether two products were "like" for GATT purposes. 122 Per the Tuna/Dolphin cases, border adjustments for carbon taxes would likely not be legal under GATT; however, because the cases were never adopted by the WTO, they have no legal weight and do little more than raise the fear that border adjustments "could not be justified by arguing that differences in PPMs made products 'unlike. '" 123 Case law aside, the legislative intent behind GATT is best examined by investigating the recorded discussions of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. 124 The Charter served as the basis for GATT and suggested that all taxes on inputs to a product were intended to be adjustable, regardless of whether the taxed entity was physically incorporated raw materials, nonincorporated inputs, or outputs themselves.
125
Even assuming that carbon tax border adjustments could pass muster under GATT Article III, commentators have labeled GATT Article I as the "elephant in the room" that may categorically invalidate the border adjustment measures.
126 Article I contains the General Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, requiring equal treatment and complete nondiscrimination among WTO signatories. 127 In relevant part, Article I states: "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." 128 In accordance with MFN treatment, "all imports of the same products must be given fully equivalent treatment vis-à-vis one another, regardless of source." 129 In particular, nations seeking to 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 McClure, supra note 95, at 267. 124 Id. at 252. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 265. 127 GATT, supra note 33, at art. I. 128 Id. at art. I(1). 129 Herman, supra note 32, at 200.
apply border adjustments on imports from countries with differentor no-greenhouse gas emission control policies must overcome the burden of proving that such measures do not violate the MFN clause of Article I. Due to the lack of international uniformity regarding carbon tax regimes, nations proposing to implement border adjustments for their domestic carbon taxes comprise a mixed system. 130 Because border adjustments would be imposed on trade with nations that lack policies for mitigating carbon emissions, nations would be favoring trade with some countries and penalizing products from countries with weak or non-existent climate policies.
131
This mixed system would result in the application of border adjustments to trade with some nations but not others, and the WTO would very likely find that such a mixed system categorically violates MFN treatment and therefore GATT Article I.
132 However, the possibility that a carbon tax regime can comport with obligations under both the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO was salvaged by the WTO Appellate Body's intervention in Shrimp/Turtle.
The Shrimp/Turtle case represents "a fundamental shift in WTO jurisprudence"
133 and arguably enables nations to discriminate based on PPMs to achieve environmental goals. 134 Despite complaints from several Asian countries that the United States could not apply its laws to foreign PPMs, the Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle upheld a U.S. law that restricted imports of shrimp caught in nets that were not equipped with turtle excluder devices. 135 The Appellate Body ultimately ruled against the United States because of the manner in which the law was implemented, but it found that the law was permissible under the Article XX exception for efforts relating to the conservation and protection of an "exhaustible natural resource[]."
136
In doing so, "the Appellate Body completed a transition in dispute settlement reasoning that, if sustained, would permit members to invoke the Article XX exemptions to regulate imports on the basis of non-product related PPMs to accomplish environmental objectives 130 McClure, supra note 95, at 265. 131 both outside their jurisdiction and in the global commons." 137 The Shrimp/Turtle case stands for the proposition that non-product related PPMs may be acceptable restraints on international trade where the implementing nation's purpose is to protect a resource that is found in the global commons. 138 Despite the potential support that this case provides for the legality of border adjustments for carbon taxes, it is important to note that, as with Superfund, it may be difficult to argue that Shrimp/Turtle strictly supports the assertion that domestic laws may be applied to restrict imports on the basis of carbon-emitting PPMs used to make the imported product. The most dissonant fact to distinguish Shrimp/Turtle from carbon tax border adjustments is that the former involved the protection of an endangered animal species, not the taxation and related adjustments of environmentally harmful greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, Shrimp/Turtle is commonly interpreted as the case that opened the door for nations to use border adjustments to counteract their domestic carbon tax regimes under GATT Article XX exceptions, even when the measures would have violated GATT Articles I and III. 139 
Border Adjustments and GATT Article XX General Exceptions
Even if border adjustments conflict with international trade law, they might still be legal if justifiable under GATT Article XX, 140 which specifies the conditions under which Members can be exempted from WTO general rules. Two of these enumerated exemptions could be relevant in the case of border adjustments: if doing so is "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health," 141 or if it "relat[es] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources."
142 WTO panel rulings have held that "governments bear the burden of justifying any measure taken under these [Article XX] exceptions and affirmatively demonstrating that the measure is both 'necessary' and directly connected with the need to protect human life or health or truly is a legitimate conservation measure." 143 In addition, we must keep in mind that the introductory paragraph ("chapeau") of Article XX allows for such measures as long as they "are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." 144 Such an exemption would most likely "center on whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT Article XX, a [border adjustment] . . . is applied on a variable scale that takes account of local conditions in foreign countries, including their own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic development in developing countries." 145 Therefore, a government "would also have to show that the measure is being applied squarely to avoid 'leakage,' rather than to offset competitive concerns."
146
Given the "strict requirements of GATT and the tendency of panels to disapprove of national measures that smack of discrimination, the debate over environmentally related border measures comes down to the availability of these GATT exceptions." 147 Consequently, nations and their policymakers alike must consider whether border adjustments for carbon taxes could survive a GATT Article XX analysis. According to the WTO Appellate Body, a two-step analysis must be followed in applying Article XX. 148 First, the proposed measure must satisfy one of the specified exceptions of Article XX. Second, the proposed measure must satisfy the chapeau of Article XX. This second layer of analysis serves as a "formidable gatekeeper," 149 as in all cases where the Appellate Body denied an Article XX exception because the chapeau was not met.
a. Exceptions to GATT Article XX
GATT Article XX lists two relevant exceptions under which nations may argue for the legality of the border adjustments for their carbon tax regimes. Paragraph (b) creates an exception for measures "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health." 151 Additionally, the Appellate Body 152 elucidates the definition of "necessary" as not the least-restrictive approach as the natural definition suggests, but instead requires merely a less restrictive approach supplemented with a necessity test. 153 To determine whether the measure truly is necessary, the Appellate Body conducts the test on a case-by-case basis, weighing the following factors: (1) the contribution made by the measure to the enforcement of the regulation at issue, (2) the importance of the common interests or values protected by the regulation, and (3) the accompanying impact of the measures on imports or exports. 154 The environmental measure proposed in EC-Asbestos 155 was the first to satisfy the Appellate Body's necessity analysis. 156 The WTO explained that the more "vital or important common interests or values" pursued by the measure, the more likely it would be to deem the proposed measure necessary. 157 Due to the sparse guidance from WTO DSBs regarding the exception concerning measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,"
158 such an analysis would be very difficult and highly speculative-the result is to leave an analysis of this exception "unsettled" for now. 159 However, the exception concerning measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" 160 contains sufficient precedent and WTO administrative analysis to be scrutinized in relation to its suitability as justification for permitting border adjustments under GATT Article XX. Nations seeking to prove the legality of border adjustments for their carbon tax regimes will likely pursue an argument under the exception from paragraph (g) for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 161 Per Shrimp/Turtle, restrictive conditions based on PPMs intended to protect the environment, such as border adjustments, may be considered legal under the Article XX, paragraph (g) exception.
162 The Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body applied a three-prong test to determine whether the exception was satisfied. 163 For the purposes of determining whether border adjustments satisfy paragraph (g), the following must be considered: (1) whether the resource in question, here the atmosphere, is an exhaustible natural resource; (2) whether a substantial relationship exists between border adjustments and the conservation of the exhaustible natural resource; and (3) whether border adjustments are even-handed, or made effective "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 164 Recall that despite the WTO's inability to bind its DSBs to precedent,
[i]f the reasoning developed in the previous report in support of the interpretation given to a WTO rule is persuasive from the perspective of the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent case, it is very likely that the panel or the Appellate Body will repeat and follow it. 165 This principle allows for a reasonable determination of how DSBs will rule in subsequent cases with regard to the abovementioned three-prong test.
The Appellate Body's decision in Reformulated Gasoline provides a durable answer to the first inquiry by explaining that air, and therefore the atmosphere, is an exhaustible natural resource. 166 161 Id. at art. XX(g). 162 Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 135. 163 Id. 164 GATT, supra note 33, at art. XX(g). 165 Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports, supra note 100. Because the paragraph (g) exception should be considered "in light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment," 167 the ratification of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol by the majority of nations would also seem to support an affirmative answer to this element. The "substantial relationship" required by the second element necessitates that a reasonable "means and ends" relationship exist between conserving the exhaustible natural resource and the proposed measure; incidental relationships will not suffice. 168 Some critics believe that border adjustments for carbon taxes will fail this element because they primarily aim not to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, but to remedy loss of competitiveness by domestic industries subject to carbon taxes. 169 However, an increasing number of scholars and academics contend that border adjustments on carbon taxes would satisfy this element because they constitute an integral part of the carbon tax regime aimed at reducing emissions.
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As an integral part of a regime focused on conserving an exhaustible natural resource, carbon tax border adjustments likely meet this second GATT requirement. However, even in the absence of such a finding before a subsequent Appellate Body, there remains a chance that the regime will not be found to violate international trade law. Assuming the carbon tax border adjustments are not applied arbitrarily or in violation of other GATT rules, the WTO may still decide to overlook the absence of a direct relationship and accept the lesser relationship between the carbon taxes and border adjustments if there is sufficient and convincing support from the international community in favor of the measures. Although only speculative at this time, as international sentiments and the effects of climate change continue to wax toward ever new zeniths, the likelihood of such an eleventh-hour acceptance becomes more and more probable.
The third element presents another difficult analysis and further obfuscates a prediction of how the WTO may rule. Element three of the Shrimp/Turtle inquiry requires the evenhandedness of the 167 See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 135. 168 Id. ¶ 135-42. 169 Rich, supra note 74, at 8. 170 proposed measure to be "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 171 Border adjustments on carbon taxes for imported goods likely would satisfy this requirement because they are indeed imposed and made effective in conjunction with a domestic carbon tax. 172 The complications arise regarding border adjustments for carbon taxes on exported goods. 173 Literally interpreted, export border adjustments would satisfy this third element because they are implemented in conjunction with a domestic carbon tax that similarly restricts production or consumption. It may be argued that the principal purpose of export border adjustments is to prevent competitive disadvantage rather than to conserve an exhaustible natural resource; however, evidence that the carbon taxes imposed on domestic production of carbon-intensive goods matched the levies on similar imported goods would vitiate this point of opposition. 174 Therefore, any tax regime must comport with the requirement to tax both imports and exports at a similar rate in order to reject suggestions that such a regime is simply a façade for implementing protectionist policies.
b. The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau
The chapeau, or introductory paragraph of GATT Article XX general exceptions, lays out the general context within which the exceptions should be read and interpreted. Proposed measures "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade" would violate the chapeau and, therefore, not qualify for the Article XX exception. 175 measures must satisfy in order to pass muster under the chapeau. 177 Carbon tax border adjustments on international trade between countries with similarly effective carbon tax regimes arguably would fail to satisfy the first clause. For example, the United States likely could not legally impose border adjustments on trade with European Union countries that already had their Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) in place because of the similarity of the conditions in both countries. 178 Although the measures are different, the effects of a carbon tax are comparable to those of an emissions trading system. Conversely, a nation within the European Union could impose carbon tax border adjustments on trade with another E.U. nation that had not adopted such measures because the "same conditions" would not exist.
The Appellate Body's decision in Brazil-Tyres 179 sheds considerable light on the chapeau's second requirement, which prohibits measures constituting disguised protectionism. It supports the assertion that carbon tax border adjustments imposed on a neutral standard 180 and criteria unrelated to a specific country may satisfy the chapeau's second requirement. 181 In Brazil-Tyres and Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body suggested that a DSB would seek to balance the competing interests when interpreting a treaty exception rather than following the traditional, narrow approach. Consequently, "this perspective is much more likely to produce a favorable ruling regarding a destination-based carbon-tax border adjustment than a more traditional legalistic narrow view of the exceptions clause." 182 For this reason, the WTO will look upon carbon tax border adjustments favorably because of the Appellate Body's willingness to conduct a balancing inquiry. Consequently, the international interest of mitigating climate change and global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions will weigh strongly in favor of carbon tax border adjustments.
